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The Chinese Market:
An Enigma Unraveled
The China Dream: The Quest for the
Last Great Untapped Market on Earth
by Joe Studwell
Atlantic Monthly Press, 2002 256 pp $22

Inequality and Poverty in China in the
Age of Globalization
by Azizur Rahman Khan and Carl Riskin
Oxford University Press, 2001 240 pp $45

Stephen F. Diamond

his spring, workers pushed out of
China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
unleashed a wave of protests that began
in the famed Daqing oilfields of northwest
China, now owned by the partially privatized
PetroChina Company. They staged massive,
though largely peaceful, demonstrations
against the meager severance payments and
health care benefits they were left with in the
wake of widespread layoffs.
The job cuts are the price paid by workers
as part of a restructuring of the oil industry
engineered by the Chinese communist regime
with the guidance of an army of Western consultants that includes PricewaterhouseCoopers, Goldman Sachs, and McKinsey and Co.
The oil workers’ protests were soon followed by others in several industrial districts
in China and included small but unprecedented demonstrations inside Beijing itself.
The situation has been brewing for some time,
with similar demonstrations occurring with
greater frequency in the past few years. University of Michigan sociologist Ching Lee describes these events as a “veritable labor insurgency.” Whether or not this wave of unrest
will lead to a final reckoning with the communist regime or whether that regime will be able
to manage a secure transition to some new
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form of authoritarian capitalism is an open
question.
Joe Studwell’s The China Dream draws on
his decade of firsthand experience writing for
the international financial press from China.
Studwell edits the China Economic Quarterly,
an independent and reliable source of information about China’s economy. The value of
his book is that it helps the reader move away
from the traditional framework that the outside world usually applies to China. There is
no question that the movement for civil liberties evidenced by the battle of the Falun Gong
for religious freedom, the Tibetans for national
liberation, or the Chinese working class for jobs
and independent unions are critical social
struggles. But Studwell asks the reader to focus on the impact that important changes to
that country’s economic and financial structure
can have on political change, a relationship that
has been misunderstood in the past.
It is instructive to look at what happened
in Eastern Europe. When I visited Poland during the martial law period of the late 1980s, I
had a lengthy and intense discussion—animated, perhaps inevitably, by a good deal of
vodka—with several underground Solidarity activists in the textile district of Lodz. Their near
fanatical adherence to the free market ideology of Friedrich von Hayek and Milton Friedman was truly unsettling. But the emergence
of this ideology in Solidarity was all but ignored
by Western activists backing the campaign of
workers to democratize communist Poland.
Sure enough, the new postcommunist regime led by former Solidarity activists implemented a brutal form of shock therapy, attempting to impose a free market economy
overnight. This helped the labor union side of
Solidarity reemerge to lead a strike wave that
threw out the government, which was replaced
by former communists! Ever since, there has
been in Poland a kind of socio-economic imDISSENT / Summer 2002
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passe, with a significant private sector in consumer goods, light industry, agriculture, and
small shops, but state ownership maintained
in many large industrial plants (at least those
that have not been shut down completely).
Studwell describes a similar phenomenon
in China, but this time the regime has implemented the Polish program without losing
power. In the early eighties, it partially freed
up prices in the agricultural sector and allowed
farmers to retain a portion of their profits. This,
in turn, unleashed pent-up demand for consumer goods, and so the regime went one step
further, endorsing the new light industry and
consumer goods businesses that began to
emerge in the rural townships and villages.
These Township and Village Enterprises
(TVEs) provided the bulk of the alleged Chinese miracle.
The results in this “golden age” were truly
astounding. Studwell describes the emergence
of an “extraordinary virtuous circle” whereby
higher prices for food stimulated demand for
basic consumer products like bicycles, televisions, and refrigerators and, increasingly, for
light industrial goods such as tractors. This process sustained growth rates averaging 9 percent for most of the 1980s. Studwell notes that
non-farm employment tripled from thirty million to ninety-three million people in that decade alone, with some sixteen million new
businesses established. These new entities are
seen by Western Sinophiles as evidence of the
emergence of a new private entrepreneurial
class in China that will allow the country, in
the words of mainstream economist Barry
Naughton, to “grow out of the Plan.”
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ut many of the TVEs were formed with
local state and party official endorsement
and participation. They have become a
new competing power center in Chinese society, absorbing scarce financial resources. They
are also the source of huge new income inequalities. In their articulate and thorough
study Inequality and Poverty in China, economists Azizur Rahman Khan and Carl Riskin
look at the impact of market reforms and find
disturbing results. Communist Party reformer
Deng Xiaoping had declared “let some get rich
first,” and the lucky few have done so with a
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vengeance. Although the country has indeed
registered huge gains in national income during the last twenty years, the gains have not
been equally reflected in the personal income
of ordinary Chinese households. Khan and
Riskin note that “between 1988 and 1995 inequality in the distribution of income in China
increased sharply [as] China [became] one of
the more unequal of the Asian developing
countries.” In rural China, the TVEs have actually worsened income inequality as the enterprises offer higher wages but to only a small
portion of the workforce, most of whom survive at or below the poverty line on whatever
their backyard plots of land can produce.
The new so-called private sector has nowhere near the resources to take on the huge
industrial needs of Chinese society. The single
largest fully private entity in China has annual
revenues of six hundred million dollars, half
the turnover of the lowest-ranked company on
the Fortune 1000 list. Even today this sector
contributes only one-eighth of the nation’s
gross domestic product and employs fewer than
twenty million workers in a nation of 1.2 billion people. In any case, the apparent economic miracle began to slow precipitously after the initial boost in the eighties. In the early
1990s, Studwell reveals, it was discovered that
the TVEs “had overstated production by more
than 40 percent,” wiping out a hundred billion dollars from the country’s national income
accounts.
The regime’s heavy capital investment created much of the actual gain in GNP, thus exacerbating inequality and poverty. Khan and
Riskin identify what is called “investment hunger,” especially among local governments that
are now less constrained by Beijing. “The state
allowed an expansion of credit to pump up accumulation and drive a wedge between growth
of GDP and that of personal income.” Thus,
they conclude, despite the impressive macro
level gains of the 1980s, as the 1990s unfolded
there was “an unusually rapid widening of income inequality . . . a much retarded rate of
poverty reduction in the countryside . . . and a
significant increase in absolute poverty in the
towns and cities.”
The SOEs still control the “commanding
heights” of the economy—steel, oil, autos, air-
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planes, and so on. In comparison to the
country’s largest fully private firm, together the
two state-owned oil companies have revenues
of more than eighty billion dollars and are comfortably placed on the Fortune Asia 25 list. In
this sector, one finds that instead of the massive privatization that took place in the former
Soviet Union with such disastrous effect, the
regime has continued to feed the enterprises
massive amounts of credit, recycling the savings of China’s billion people into outdated and
poor-performing industrial behemoths.
hese enterprises are truly from a different age—the age of Soviet-influenced
heavy industry or the American variant,
the massive auto complex at Ford’s River
Rouge. These plants were, like their Soviet,
American, or East European counterparts, impressive achievements—fifty years ago. But by
world terms today, they are bankrupt. The regime is in a trap of its own making. Having
created this heavy industrial base, it has also
created a massive industrial working class—or
rather, its working class created this massive
industrial base, through brutal forced labor in
the fifties and sixties. But to restructure now
in a fashion that would allow these companies
to be globally competitive will require huge layoffs and huge new capital investment. To make
the PetroChina initial public offering credible
to global capital markets required the layoff of
hundreds of thousands and a promise to push
billions in debts back to its state-owned parent company.
The regime believes that the only way it
can preserve its own power is to keep “muddling through,” in Studwell’s words. Thus, the
regime allows foreign companies to set up assembly plants in the special economic zones
in coastal areas and, in the niches not already
occupied by the state sector, encourages a limited domestic private sector to evolve from below. But it cannot allow the resulting inequalities and poverty this process causes to become
so extreme that workers revolt. The regime
fears a social explosion, called by the Chinese
da luan, or total chaos, a fear made real by the
labor insurgency now underway in the oilfields
run by PetroChina. The pall of Hungary in
1956 and Poland in 1980 hangs over the Chi-
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nese Communists.
Meanwhile, the regime feeds enough credit
to the SOEs to keep them alive, conditioning
the credit on hoped-for restructuring, but not
giving so much credit that inflation is unleashed. Inflation has been a continuing problem, causing the regime to punctuate the
growth of the last two decades with periods of
harsh austerity. What many in the West view
as a struggle between hard- and soft-liners, or
between a Maoist left and a market socialist
right, is really a reflection of managing a business cycle with “Chinese characteristics.”
This is a risky business. The price controls
of the late 1980s certainly tamed an inflation
rate that reached 50 percent in 1988, but the
austerity was a key factor in triggering the 1989
social revolt centered in Beijing’s Tiananmen
Square. The protests received widespread
popular support with marches of a million
workers or more in several major cities. The
regime could only kill the movement by relying on the murderous efficiency of crack troops
from the People’s Liberation Army. After hundreds were killed, controlling wages was much
less of a problem for several years.
But “muddling through” may not be sufficient. The credit that sustains the process must
come from somewhere. The free trade zones
on the Chinese coast are fed by foreign direct
investment. But the SOEs and the domestic
private sector rely on the recycling of the huge
savings of ordinary Chinese people. Since the
banking system is state owned and, in theory,
the renminbi is not convertible into foreign
currencies, Chinese workers, peasants, and
small businesses are forced to finance the continued capital accumulation drive of the communist regime. The whole game depends on
the regime’s continuing top-down control of
that financial system. Thus, Studwell notes,
promises in the early 1980s that the currency
would be convertible as early as 1993 are now
put off well into the future.
Of course, if the renminbi were freely tradable on the world markets, and if ordinary Chinese savers could freely hold their savings in
foreign banks or invest them in the equities of
European or American companies as their
counterparts do in the West and much of Asia,
there would be a massive bank run as the value
DISSENT / Summer 2002
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of Chinese assets would be forced to come into
line with global values. The pressure on domestic values is so great, Studwell argues, that
even without convertibility or an opening of the
financial sector, a bank run is still a possibility. “Everything comes down to psychology . . .
the psychology of the ordinary Chinese people,”
he notes.
From this vantage point, events like those
of 1989 take on new meaning. In Studwell’s
eyes, here is where the world may finally wake
up from its China Dream. In the case of China,
the “hot money” that sparked the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s is actually represented by the domestic savings of ordinary
Chinese. The regime’s credibility, and therefore its power, depends on maintaining the
credibility of its economic policy. It is not just
that the regime fears a Solidarity-like protest
movement rising up in reaction to political repression or unemployment; it also fears the
tearing away of the veil that covers up the
country’s financial fragility. This could cause
the population to lose faith in the regime and,
in turn, trigger a massive political upheaval.
hat are the escape routes for the regime? A massive debt-for-equity
swap is one. Because the debts the
state has piled up using domestic savings must
actually be repaid and in the meantime must
pay interest, they can get very expensive. The
state-owned banks now hold massive amounts
of nonperforming loans made to the SOEs and
the TVEs. And the government has huge unfunded pension liabilities. Studwell estimates
a debt to equity ratio of nearly 500 percent for
the state sector—outstripping even South Korea on the verge of its economic collapse in
1997. By creating stock markets, the regime
has tried to encourage Chinese savers to invest instead in equity issued by these same
state companies. The regime dreams of mutual funds rescuing it from the pension trap it
faces. Equity holders typically expect capital
gains over time and hope that inside managers
will pay out regular dividends, but neither is
legally mandated. Corporate insiders in China
need not fear the disciplinary effect of a potential takeover by competitors or financial
players because there is, as of yet, no competi-
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tive market for corporate control in China. This
shift to equity finance explains the stock market mania that hit China in the 1990s. The regime engaged, it appears, in a massive “pump
and dump” scheme touting share ownership in
companies that may actually be worthless. In
the first half of 1992, the Shanghai stock market index registered a gain of 1200 percent.
A second strategy has been to turn to foreign stock markets, first in Hong Kong, but
more recently to the New York Stock Exchange.
There, Chinese companies have had less success. The pump and dump has not fooled quite
as many investors. Whereas Chinese companies trade their stock both at home and on the
Hong Kong exchange, the shares sold in Hong
Kong, Studwell notes, trade at a substantial discount, as much as 85 percent, giving some idea
of the discount factor that one might have to
apply to the entire Chinese economy if its assets were freely tradable.
Finally, the regime has encouraged the establishment of foreign investment in the socalled Special Economic Zones. But even
their explosive growth makes a small dent in
this massive country. More important, their
potential future growth is limited. Most of
these plants are only final assembly points in
a global assembly line, so that the value added
by Chinese workers is a small percentage of
top-line revenue. The sector shipped $150
billion worth of goods in 2000, but less than
25 percent of that was value added in the free
trade areas in China. The state sector cannot
compete in quality and reliability with the foreign suppliers that feed parts into the assembly plants. In addition, the companies are
heavily dependent on the infrastructure provided by coastal proximity to Hong Kong and
Taiwan. Interestingly, as Khan and Riskin
note, despite what free trade theory might
predict, the industrialization in this and the
TVE sectors “so far . . . have been quite employment-hostile” with a “drastic” decline in
increases in employment even as output
spurted ahead.
Studwell and Khan and Riskin slowly but
surely puncture the China Dream. Western
companies that thought the era of reform
would open up a market of 1.2 billion consumers are, Studwell says, “waiting for Godot.”
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Hundreds of millions of dollars have been
wasted on exploratory projects pushed by overly
ambitious Western CEOs, investment bankers,
and government trade representatives. The reality is that China is still controlled by an
opaque undemocratic regime that has its own
plans. Its drive to accumulate and to compete
with the rest of the world on the basis of that
accumulation process has not lessened despite
appearances to the contrary.
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s there a viable alternative? Perhaps.
Studwell wants the state to get out of the
economy altogether, yet he argues that
only state power can simultaneously prevent
the collapse of the currency and the banking
system and keep the lid on social protest.
More promisingly, Khan and Riskin outline an
ambitious set of policy reforms that emphasize balanced growth and social equity. Unfortunately, they leave out any assessment of

the political reality of modern China. They
suggest that the state must undertake these
reforms, but there is scant evidence of any
significant base of support within the existing Chinese state interested in balance and
equity as opposed to accumulation and competition. As they rightly point out, the regime
consciously set about to increase inequality in
order to force competition among sectors of
the population.
If the direction in which Khan and Riskin
point—a process of genuine economic development in China based on balance and equity—became part of the program of an independent and democratic Chinese labor movement, then a very different future for the country could open up.
•
Stephen F. Diamond teaches international
economic law at the Santa Clara University
School of Law in Santa Clara, California.

The New Killing Fields
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